In this paper we continue to publish the results of our work with eALIS, a new "post-Montagovian" discourse semantic theory, demonstrating its functioning on a few classical semantic problems. We retain mathematical exactness while simultaneously applying cognitive paradigm. Previously we wrote study programs, for testing purposes, now we are building a (lexical) Prolog fact database. Although we are implementing the grammatical analysis, too, it is important to note here that the whole process of grammatical (phonological, morphological and syntactic) analysis is practically included in only one () of the four basic functions while the other three describe various parts of semantics.
INTRODUCTION
The long-term goal of the eALIS project is automated discourse analysis, preferably including effective information extraction, text summarization, machine translation (e.g. the translation of European legal text) and analyzing NL queries.
To do all this, we provide the eALIS theory of discourse semantics (Alberti et al., 2010b) as a simultaneous extension of SDRT (Asher-Lascarides 2003) and LDRT (Alberti, 2000) , which can be regarded as a compromise between the total rejection of formalization by cognitive semanticists and the different kinds of higher order intensional logic applied by formal semanticists, say, Pollard (2007) or Kamp et al. (2011) . Here, we provide a basic data structure based on Prolog facts on which the implementation of eALIS will be based.
EALIS

eALIS, Reciprocal and Lifelong Interpretation System
We hereby summarize the main concepts of eALIS which were introduced in Alberti et al. 2010b as a "post-Montagovian" (Kampian) theory concerning the formal interpretation of sentences constituting coherent discourses (see also Asher-Lascarides 2003) . eALIS has a LIfelong model of lexical, interpersonal ("REciprocal") and cultural knowledge of interpreters, too. "LIfelong" also means that the DRS-like structures of eALIS are continuously being built, being able to reach an arbitrary degree of complexity -much like the structures of "world knowledge" in the human mind itself. eALIS reconciles three objectives of formal semantics: the exact formal basis itself (Montague's Thesis), compositionality (postulating the existence of a homomorphism from syntax to semantics) and, most importantly, eALIS' own "discourse representationalism". The main difference between Kampian (and its extensions) and eALIS' DRT is that the outer world, the states of the interpreters' mind and the information structure of discourses (which are also stored in the interpreter's mind, becoming part of it) are described by a unified model (see detailed def. in Alberti 2011a:139-149) . To do this, the infons of Seligman-Moss (1997:245) are used to describe information structure from the view of the external world and the vertical hierarchy of the so-called worldlets which are parts of the internal (mental) world. Shortly, the information state of any interpreter is depicted by eALIS' own DRS boxes. A part of the external world is projected into them so that each interpreter's unique perception and knowledge about the world -or parts of these -is represented by an internal world with multiple worldlets. Embedded worldlets are used to describe the hierarchy of fictiveness and interpersonal knowledge (see Figure 4) , too.
The principal theoretical difference between the Montagovian semantics, the Kampian DRT and eALIS is shown here: 
Explanation of eALIS' Definition
To provide sufficient theoretical background to our database, we give a short explanation of eALIS' world model (Alberti, 2011a:139-149) , see also pp. 151-179 for the detailed definition of its dynamic and static interpretation), providing some additional information to Alberti et al. 2010b . These structures were (partially) implemented as data structures (as shown in Section 4), the four internal functions form the starting point of a future eALIS program.
U and the External
T=T,, S=S,, I=I,, D=D,. First of all we note that all sets are finite or countable, e.g. time and space are based on Q. Secondly, U 0 (and U) also contains elements that belong to the structure of eALIS itself -because they, too, can be referred. The set of possible time intervals (T) is isomorphic with the set of Q's intervals). Spatial entities (S  Q 3 ), interpreters (I) and physical linguistic signs (D) are also included.
The relations over T, S and I (marked by ,  and ) are arbitrary, but  must contain Dis ( D as a unary relation, containing the discourses as linguistic entities) and Morph ( D 2 where d', d  Morph if d' is a morph (in the linguistic sense) of the discourse d. The set of morphs of any discourse must be linearly ordered. The set of core relations (  TU 0 *) of the external world must have a compulsory PERCEIVE element used by the infon (Seligman-Moss 1997) In Figure 4 , a different (simplified, timeless, eventuality-based) notation is used. For example, e 1 ': p kill r witch r cow means (Pred,,e 1 ') = p kill (functional notation); (Arg, 1 ,e 1 ')=r witch and (Arg, 2 , e 1 ')=r cow respectively, where  describes the event structure of to kill (no preparation/result phase, only cumulative phase: John was killed in a few seconds.),  1 is "Agent",  2 is "Patient" according to Alberti-Kilián 2010 , see Section 4.
The anchoring function works in a similar way: an example is (Ant,Top,Gen,r she )=r witch . The first element of  is the type of anchoring: Argument, Predicate, Adjunct, Antecedent, Outwards (meaning that the result of  is not a referent [ i U[i] ] but an external entity of U 0 ). The second element of  is an ordered n-tuple representing the (language dependent) factors that legitimize the anchoring: Number, Gender, Topic retaining, Humanity etc.
The level function marks the worldlet which contains the referent. Only fictive referents are projected by , the root referents are not (but they can be anchored "outwards" by means of  instead). The level label system is defined in a such way that one can reach the root referent i* by repeatedly applying : The cursor function is
. K is a finite set of pre-defined cursor labels and must contain the following elements (among others):
The temporary states of these four internal functions above an interpreter's internal universe serve as her "agent model" in the process of (static and dynamic) interpretation.
The interpretation of any "perceived" discourse can be defined in our model relative to an external world W 0 and internal world W [i,t] . (summary: (Alberti et al. 2011b) ), (details: (Alberti 2011a) ). Since the data structure that we intend to describe is a mapping of the actual world model, and most importantly, its four internal functions, we do not go into the depths of the mathematical definition of the interpretation. Indeed, we summarize the process of the actual discourse analysis later on.
Illustration of the Apparatus of eALIS
Let us consider a sentence (1a) with two meanings. The figure in the center in (1d) shows the lexical items which have been retrieved by the words of the sentence (eventuality function ). 
WHERE ARE THE POSSIBLE WORLDS?
The Granularity Problem as a Further Argument for eALIS
Let our starting point be Pollard's criticism on the mainstream Kripke/Montague-inspired possibleworlds (PW) semantics: it is "a framework known to have dubious foundations" (Pollard, 2007:1) because of the granularity problem (2), among other deficiencies (3); and hence "the idea of taking worlds as a primitive of semantic theory is a serious misstep" (Pollard, 2007:33) . Another stubborn problem in mainstream NL semantics concerns distinct accessibility of certain referents in logically equivalent sentences (4). In this area a promising solution is offered by DRT, but at the cost (see (5) Following this way we have elaborated a "ReAL" interpretation system (6a), which provides straightforward solutions (6b-f) to (2-5), including even the Hob-Nob problem (4d). The essence of the granularity problem is that having the same reference / meaning (see (2)) is not a sufficient condition to allow replacement of one name / sentence for another in a larger expression. The other problem (Pollard, 2007:30-31) lies in "the standard view, [viz.] reference is compositional"; that is why "Frege had to resort to claiming that utterances of sentences in certain contexts [e.g. S3 in (3)] had the customary sense as the reference," which requires "sleight of hand." We follow Pollard in assuming that "worlds are constructed from propositions ..., and not the other way around" (Pollard, 2007:34) , but intend to work out this approach in a DRT-based framework in order to account for phenomena concerning referent accessibility (4a-d), at the same time. We claim, however, that our system is devoid of DRT's "extra level" problem (5). (4b) S1 and S2 are logically equivalent: x  x (4c) The representation of Discourse1/ Discourse2 in DRT: x "enclosed" is not accessible to y (4d) Hob believes that a witch has killed Cob's cow and Nob thinks that she has blighted Bob's sow.
(5) An Argument against DRT: DRS is an illegitimate extra level of representation between syntactic structure and the model of world in the course of interpretation (Groenendijk-Stokhof, 1991) . 
eALIS as an Epistemic
Multi-agent System eALIS is based on the idea that (gigantic) DRSlike structures, set W, are suitable for serving as lifelong representations of information states of interpreters, i.e. the "agents" getting information. Furthermore, as stated in Alberti et al. 2010b , both static evalutation (Tru) and dynamic interpretation (Dyn) can be carried out. Labeled tree systems of worldlets can serve as parts of the world model (6f): the interpretation of modal sentences is to be based on certain worldlets instead of W (6c).
Summary 6: ReALIS as an epistemic multi-agent system and its features.
(6a)  = W o , W, Dyn, Tru (6b) (2): co-anchoring ((r')=(r")) does not necessarily imply the identity of referents (r' and r"); identifying (and concluding, whose amount does matter) requires accommodation (6c) (3): S1 is true if S3's eventuality referent can be found in an appropriately labeled worldlet of JT (containing JT's thoughts on PH's beliefs) (6e) (4a-b): certain referents may be "enclosed" in the worldlet structure (6f) (4d): see Figure 4 ; what provides more freedom in constructing worldlet structures in eALIS is that DRT's box structure depends on logical factors whereas the worldlet structure is affected by pragmatic factors (as well) (6g)  (5): DRS-like representations form no "extra level" but turn into parts of the eALIS world model (enriched with descriptions of interpreters themselves) The content of worldlets can be enriched by (chiefly pragmatics-dependent) accommodation, too: identifying referents (6b, e) or drawing logical inferences can be bound to pragmatic conditions. Let the last figure serve as an illustration. The representation to the left expresses the pure semantic content of (4d). According to this, Hob's witch is not yet accessible to the referent of she. But then we can consider some pragmatic factor, discussed by Zeevat (2005:549) 
IMPLEMENTATION
Basic Principles of the Data
Structure and the Function 
In eALIS, the decomposition of syntax plays a crucial role (Alberti, 2011b) . Syntactic and semantic information are stored together in the core lexicon or produced by the lexical rules (Alberti et al., 2010a) , according to our 'totally lexicalist' approach. To handle all these data, we use a Prolog engine which is also able to handle non-determinism (see also Figure 2 : the sentence can be disambiguated after having some more sentences of the discourse). For now, theoretical consistency in the implementation of the eALIS model is more important -but in the long run, the theory itself may be refined to improve the speed of our program and/or reduce its computational complexity: as the human brain has its own limits revealed by psycholinguists, our program does not need to surpass them either. (One such limit is the depth of discourse analysis.) Here we summarize the practical Prolog equivalents of our concepts as parts of a (future) Prolog fact database. In the program itself we excessively use assert and retract to manage it. We note here that for now, we are working primarily on Hungarian (a highly agglutinative language with free word order) and English.
-Input:
Step 1: morphologically tagged SL text;
Step 2: untagged SL text -Output: discourse representation, Step 3: make bidirectional use of the program possible (for e.g. machine translation). The verb to give is reified and stored as data (string) but we can rebuild it by using extra-logical techniques. 
Conclusion: make_angry(21,EGO).
Temporal Referents are handled by time intervals: a week ago is described by date (past, (0,0,1,0,0,0,0),(0,0,0,1,0,0,0) ). The first 1 is in the field weeks while the second one marks the 'precision' of the linguistic expressionabout one day in the English language. now is regarded as a special temporal referent.
The words and their default morphology and parts of their syntax and semantics are stored in the core lexicon. This is basically the same as stated in (Alberti et al., 2003) and (Alberti-Kilián, 2010 ) but each feature (POS, type of morpheme etc.) is described by a different fact. Lexical units search for each other by offering and demanding features.
lexfeatval(301,3,'Nom-Subj'). lexfeat ('Bob', 301, +7) .
This means that the 'Bob' offers a grammatical case of 'NOM-Subject' with rank +7. The same applies to POS, referentiality/definiteness etc. If morphological inflection takes place, the default features are overridden: in Hungarian, Bob-ot Acc will get a new lexfeat ('Bob', 302, +1) feature, which has a "stronger" rank of +1. Now we take a look into the "demand" part of the database. Verbs search for their arguments:
semdemand('GIVE','Agent',1). %1 would be 2,3 etc. for more args synsem('GIVE','en','give'). synsem('GIVE','hu','ad'). %etc. %Note: syndemand is for English syndemand('give','Noun',1,+2). syndemand('give','Nom-Subj',1,+2). syndemand('give','Nei-3',1,+2). %1 is the same as in semdemand %strings become ID's in the real DB As it is shown, the semantic field GIVE has several language-dependent syntactical representations. Here we only show the facts for the agent (subject) of the English verb give (ad in Hungarian). Its patient and beneficiary can be represented in a similar way. Nei-3 is a neighborhood rank of -3 meaning that Argument 1 must take place before the verb with rank 3 but this requirement can be overridden with any other fact with rank e.g. +1.
The Anchoring Function 
The function  anchors referents to each other. Anchored referents are supposed to refer to the same thing but anchoring is not necessarily permanent. The relations behind  must be defined by a background ontology: the legitimizing factors are often extra-grammatical, based only on semantic categories (e.g. when a parrot is mentioned as a bird). In subsection 4.1 (alpha(22,21)) this is not the case: that can have a function of referring to the eventuality -formally, (Ant,Eve,r 22 )=e 21 . However, alpha is restricted to mark antecedents (Ant) in its present form without labels.
Multiple grammatical and semantic factors are involved in  and not all analyses are correct. So we plan to use a cost/weight metric for  to measure discourse coherence. If it surpasses a certain limit (which is set by the user), the discourse is considered incoherent and ill-formed. (The same applies for tolerance to grammatical errors and .)
The Level Function 
 assigns all referents to the specified worldlet(s) of eALIS and describes mood and rhetorical relations. As defined, all referents must carry all level labels -as shown here: The second argument of lambda is the abovementioned list of level labels. Each level label has six parameters according to the definition: co/sub marks how the actual worldlet is related to the next one in the label chain, the first number (0 by default) marks the level of belief etc. (where applicable), 101 is a placeholder for the interpreter's ID, and, finally, the polarity is marked by +1/0/-1 (believed etc. to be true, "don't know" or false).
 is set inherently by verbs (e.g. to believe, to think, to desire), adjectives (alleged) and some other words (e.g. negative words) and morphemes (modal markers).
CONCLUSIONS
A full implementation of eALIS is yet to come but our progress and partial results are going to be published continuously. We demonstrated the functioning of the eALIS model on a few classical semantic problems, arguing that the cognitive paradigm does not necessarily exclude mathematical exactness. By now, we fixed most of the data formats of the lexicon and database.
Although we plan to use external ontologies and/or dictionaries, their integration into the eALIS software is only the first step. Since eALIS is a lifelong [self reference] interpretation system, our database is designed to build itself (by assertions) when analyzing discourses. So the values of the three base functions -,  and  (and the cursor function  whose exact functioning is yet to be determined) form an integrate part of the database even if the relations discussed here are analyzed on-the-fly.
